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ABSTRACT
In 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
released interpretive guidelines regarding antifraud liability for
statements and disclosures made on company Web sites. The SEC
noted that a company may incur both criminal and civil liability
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 for
hyperlinks to third-party content. However, the Communications
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), expressly preempts civil liability for
interactive computer service providers that post hyperlinks to thirdparty content on their Web sites. This Article examines whether
section 230 immunizes companies from civil liability for hyperlinks to
third-party content despite the SEC’s interpretive guidelines imposing
antifraud liability. This Article concludes that companies would likely
be considered information content providers under section 230 and
therefore outside the scope of the safe harbor provision for interactive
computer service providers.
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INTRODUCTION
In response to rapidly expanding Internet use, the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increasingly recognized the
advantage of having issuers of securities publish company
communications, statements, and reports on company Web sites.1 SEC
1

See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591,
Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993,
2005 WL 1692642 (Aug. 3, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Release]; Use of Electronic
Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856, Exchange Act Release No. 42,728,
Investment Company Act Release No. 24,426, 2000 WL 502290 (April 28, 2000)
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guidelines released since 1995 detail a trend towards not only greater
acceptance of the Internet as an efficient means for fulfilling disclosure
requirements of the Securities Act (’33 Act) and the Securities and
Exchange Act (’34 Act),2 but also increased regulation of company
disclosures online.3 In the 2008 Commission Guidance on the Use of
Company Web Sites (Guidelines), the SEC clarified its position of
imposing liability for communications, statements, and reports
published on company Web sites.4 To protect investors from
misleading hyperlinked content on company Web sites, section 10(b)
of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-55 impose civil liability for hyperlinked
third-party content containing a material misstatement or omission
that is attributable to the company.6
[hereinafter 2000 Release]; Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities
Act Release No. 7233, Exchange Act Release No. 36,345, Investment Company Act
Release No. 21,399, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,458 (Oct. 13, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Release].
2
For instance, issuers are now encouraged to make prospectuses (2005 Release),
annual reports (2000 Release), proxy materials (2000 Release), and Regulation FD
disclosures (2008 Release) available online.
3
For example, when a company is in registration, communication on the
company’s Web site—including hyperlinked information—that meets the definition of
an “offer to sell,” “offer for sale” or “offer” under section 2(a)(3) of the ’33 Act is
subject to liability under section 5 of the ’33 Act. 2000 Release, supra note 1. In the
2000 Release the SEC requested comment on whether a company may be liable for
communications made by or on behalf of a company on electronic forums, including
blogs. In 2008, liability for communications was expanded to communications on
electronic forums. Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites,
Exchange Act Release No. 58,288, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,351,
2008 WL 4068202, (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/
2008/34-58288.pdf.
4
Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act
Release No. 58,288, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,351, 2008 WL
4068202 (Aug. 7, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Release], available at http://www.sec.
gov/rules/interp/2008/34-58288.pdf.
5
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/
15/usc_sec_15_00000078---j000-.html; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, available at http://
www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34ActRls/rule10b-5.html.
6
2008 Release, supra note 4. While this Article discusses liability for hyperlinks
under section 10(b) of the ’34 Act, a company may also be liable under provisions of
the ’33 Act and the ’34 Act for hyperlinks to third-party content, such as section
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Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides a safe
harbor for interactive computer service providers by preempting
liability for publishing third-party content.7 If section 230 preempts
antifraud liability under the ’34 Act, a company would be immunized
from civil liability.8 However, a company’s antifraud liability for
hyperlinks to third-party content under the ’34 Act appears to be
outside the scope of the section 230 safe harbor for interactive
computer service providers. This Article examines (1) the nature of the
SEC’s Guidelines regarding liability for hyperlinks to third-party
information under the Securities and Exchange Act and (2) whether
section 230 can immunize a company from antifraud liability described
in the Guidelines for hyperlinks to third-party content.
I. SEC GUIDELINES IMPOSE LIABILITY ON COMPANIES HYPERLINKING
TO THIRD-PARTY CONTENT TO PROTECT INVESTORS
According to the SEC’s interpretive releases on the use of company
Web sites, companies are responsible for statements that may
“reasonably be expected to reach investors or the securities markets
17(a) of the ’33 Act for fraudulent sales or offers to sell securities.
7
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006), available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/
230.html.
8
See Eric Goldman, SEC’s Proposed Guidance on Hyperlinking Contravenes 47 USC
230, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG, Nov. 05, 2008, http://blog.
ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/11/secs_proposed_g.htm (arguing “§ 230 preempts
all civil causes of action based on third party online content – even causes of action
enforced by the SEC.”); Eric Goldman, SEC Proposes that Companies Should Be Liable
for Content Linked From the Company’s Web site, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW
BLOG, Aug. 28, 2008, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/08/sec_
proposes_th.htm (noting section 230 may provide a defense against fraudulent
marketing under the ‘34 Act); Eric Goldman, Do the FTC’s New
Endorsement/Testimonial Rules Violate 47 USC 230?, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING
LAW BLOG, Oct. 06, 2009, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/10/
do_the_ftcs_new.htm (analogizing prior arguments made against the SEC to the
Federal Trade Commission’s imposition of liability for advertisers linking to
misleading endorsements under the Federal Trade Commission guidelines codified
in 16 C.F.R. § 255).

2010]

COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT PROVIDES NO SAFE HARBOR

53

regardless of the medium through which the statements are made,
including the Internet.”9 Because of the widespread use of the Internet
amongst investors, any online content attributed to a company can
reasonably be expected to reach investors. Liability not only extends to
communications made by or on behalf of a company on Web sites,
blogs, or forums, but may also extend to hyperlinked content of third
parties, such as reports made by financial analysts embedded on a
company Web site that can be attributed to that company.10 A private
cause of action may be brought against a company for hyperlinked
content under section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 when the
hyperlinked content can be attributed to the company and the
hyperlink creates a material misstatement or omission in connection
with the sale or purchase of the company’s securities.11
The SEC considers hyperlinked content embedded on a company’s
Web site attributable to that company when the company has either
entangled itself in the preparation of the information or adopted the
information.12 Under the entanglement theory, third-party content is
attributable to a company when the company was involved in the
preparation of the information.13 For instance, a company may be
9

2000 Release, supra note 1, § (II)(B); see also 2008 Release, supra note 5.
2008 Release, supra note 4, §§ II(B)(2),(4). See generally Robert A. Prentice,
Vernon J. Richardson, & Susan Scholz, Corporate Web Site Disclosure and Rule 10B-5:
An Empirical Evaluation, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 531 (1999) (examining the various
mechanisms by which a company can be held liable under Rule 10b-5).
11
2008 Release, supra note 4; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006), available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/15/usc_sec_15_00000078---j000-.html; 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, available at http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34ActRls/rule10b5.html.
12
2000 Release, supra note 1, § II(B)(1).
13
Id. See also In re Presstek, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 997, 66 SEC Docket
328, § III(C)(3)(a) (Dec. 22, 1997) (holding issuers liable for false statements by
others made in a research report if the issuer has “sufficiently entangled itself” with
the content. (quoting Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir.
1980))). In re Presstek indicates that proof of an issuers involvement in the preparation
is necessary, but notes Eisenstadt v. Allen, 113 F.3d 1240, 1997 WL 211313 (9th Cir.
1997) (unpublished table decision), leaving the door open for post-preparation
involvement to be sufficient to attribute content to the issuer. Id.
10

54

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [Vol. 6:1

entangled if its activity suggests an implied representation that the
third-party content was reviewed and is in accordance with the
company’s views.14
Under the adoption theory, the content is attributable to the
company if the company either “explicitly or implicitly endorsed or
approved the information” regardless of whether the company was
involved in the preparation of the content.15 A company is presumed
to have implicitly adopted information when it includes a hyperlink
within a report that must be filed pursuant to federal securities laws.16
However, when hyperlinks are used, for example, on a company Web
site, the circumstances surrounding the use of the hyperlinks must be
considered to determine whether the hyperlinked content should be
implicitly attributed to a company.17 In general, providing a link to
third-party content indicates a company’s belief that “the information
on the third-party website may be of interest to the users of its
website.”18
To avoid the attribution of hyperlinked content, a company may
use disclaimers, intermediary screens explaining why the link was
provided, or exit notices between the company’s Web site and the
third-party’s Web site.19 However, no single tactic immunizes a company from attribution of content under the adoption theory.20 Ultimately, adoption of content is determined by examining whether there
14

Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980).
2000 Release, supra note 1, § II(B)(1).
16
Id.
17
2008 Release, supra note 4, § II(B)(2) (for instance, the SEC notes that a
company’s statements about the hyperlink, the risk of confusion for investors,
precautions taken to warn investors, and the presentation of the hyperlinked
information on the Web site should inform a company as to whether a hyperlink will
be attributable).
18
Id.
19
Id. See also Mason Miller, Technoliability: Corporate Websites, Hyperlinks, and Rule
10(b)-5, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 367, 395 (2001) (discussing use of disclaimers
accompanying hyperlinks to fall within the safe harbor for forward-looking
statements codified in the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
20
Id. Of note, waivers of liability under the ’34 Act are ineffective. 15 USC §
78cc (2006).
15
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is a reasonable inference that the company endorsed or approved the
content.21
II. SAFE HARBOR UNDER SECTION 230 DOES NOT IMMUNIZE
COMPANIES FROM LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE ’34 ACT
AND RULE 10B-5
Section 230(c) of the Communication Decency Act (CDA) is
generally understood to immunize interactive computer service providers (service providers) from civil liability for state and federal claims
regarding third-party content published on their Web site.22 It has been
suggested that section 230 may immunize a company that violated
section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 by hyperlinking from the
company Web site to third-party content.23 However, section 230
cannot preempt antifraud liability under section 10(b) of the ’34 Act
and Rule 10b-5 when the section 230 safe harbor can be harmonized
with the SEC’s imposition of liability under the Guidelines and there
is no conflict between the two rules.24 Because companies that have
21

Id.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006), available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/
47/230.html. A service provider can be immunized from a variety of claims under
the section 230 safe harbor. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.
2008) (stating that “courts have construed the immunity provisions in section 230
broadly in all cases arising from the publication of user-generated content.”);
Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane: The
Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 297-98 (2002) (describing the broad application of the section
230 safe harbor to various state law claims ranging from negligence to infliction of
emotional distress).
23
See, e.g., Eric Goldman, SEC’s Proposed Guidance on Hyperlinking Contravenes 47
USC 230, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG, Nov. 05, 2008
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/11/secs_proposed_g.htm. Goldman
suggests that section 230 preempts antifraud liability. However, if section 230 and
the imposition of liability under section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act and Rule 10b-5 are not
in conflict because antifraud liability for a company is outside the scope of the
section 230 safe harbor, section 230 cannot preempt antifraud liability.
24
The canon of harmonization requires a court to reconcile conflicting statutes
where possible so that each is effective in its purpose. See Timothy K. Armstrong,
22
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adopted third-party content, or participated in its preparation, appear
to be outside the intended, apparent, and judicially interpreted scope
of section 230 safe harbor for service providers, the rules are not in
conflict and section 230 cannot be used as an affirmative defense to a
section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 violation.
A. The Congressional Intent of Section 230 Indicates that Company
Liability Under the ’34 Act is Outside the Scope of Safe Harbor
The CDA was promulgated to prevent exposure of objectionable
and indecent materials to minors.25 Congress recognized that while
service providers may be able to limit the quantity of objectionable and
indecent materials online, the service providers could not possibly
regulate all materials posted by third parties. Because Congress feared
the threat of tort liability would decrease incentives for service
providers to continue contributing to the growth of the Internet,26
section 230 was added to immunize service providers who blocked or
screened objectionable material27 by providing that service providers
shall not be held liable on account of self-regulatory activity and “shall
not be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, FN 341
(2004) (describing the role of the judiciary to harmonize apparently conflicting
statutes when possible). But see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (noting that there are number of applicable canons, many of
which may be paradoxically applied, and their ultimate usefulness is heavily
influenced by the desired outcome).
25
See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V §
230 (1996).
26
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 2341 (1998). See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (affirming “It is the policy of the
United States . . . to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media . . .”).
27
H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (where the House of Representatives
amendment, later codified as section 230, is intended to “protect[ ] from civil liability
those providers and users of interactive computer services for actions to restrict or to
enable restriction of access to objectionable online material.”).
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by another information content provider.”28
By enacting section 230, Congress specifically intended to overrule
decisions such as Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services, which imposed
liability on service providers for third-party content.29 In Stratton,
Prodigy Services was a service provider of an online bulletin holding
itself out to the public as controlling the content of messages posted by
third parties.30 When the service provider did not either edit or remove
unlawful content, the service provider was found liable as a publisher
of unlawful third-party content despite the service provider’s
arguments that it was impossible to patrol all of the content posted to
the bulletin.31 Section 230 specifically overturned Stratton by
precluding the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider
for editing or regulating third-party content.
The legislative record does not indicate blanket immunity for all
service providers under section 230. Rather, section 230 safe harbor
appears to be restricted to those service providers, such as Prodigy
Services, that are not claiming the content as their own but rather are
acting merely as conduits or editors of material posted by third parties.
Companies liable under the ’34 Act for hyperlinks to third-party
content are more than mere service providers, such as Prodigy Services,
that may or may not edit third-party content. Such companies
deliberately place hyperlinks to third-party content because they have
determined that the information is useful and intend Web site visitors
to read and consider the content. Companies that post content to
further a Web site visitor’s understanding of the company are readily
distinguishable from companies, such as Prodigy Services, offering a
forum by which third parties can choose to post their own content. As
such, a company liable under the ’34 Act appears to be outside the intended scope of the section 230 safe harbor.
28

47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (citing Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (unpublished opinion)).
30
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1995) (unpublished opinion).
31
Id.
29
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Further, the SEC’s goal of protecting investors from being misled
in the securities market by holding companies liable for hyperlinked
information is consistent with Congress’s intent that section 230 only
provide safe harbor for service providers acting as mere conduits of
third-party content on the Internet. Precluding companies from
invoking the section 230 safe harbor for conduct impermissible under
the ’34 Act would not have the detrimental effect on the growth of the
Internet Congress sought to avoid. In fact, the SEC anticipates
increasing use of the Internet by companies seeking to communicate
with investors.32
B. The Plain Meaning of Section 230 Indicates that Companies Liable
Under the ’34 Act are Outside the Scope of Safe Harbor
The plain meaning of section 230(c) broadly grants federal immunity against all civil causes of action.33 The only significant limitation to section 230(c) is that safe harbor only applies to service providers, not information content providers (content providers).34 A
service provider is “any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to
a computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services
offered by libraries or educational institutions.”35 By contrast, a
content provider is “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole
or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”36
While service providers act as a conduit for posting information,
content providers have played some role in creating or developing the
information posted online. Because section 230(c)(1) immunizes only
32

See supra note 7.
§ 230(e). See also, Band & Schruers, supra note 22.
34
§ 230(c)(1) (stating, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”).
35
§ 230(f)(2).
36
§ 230(f)(3).
33
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service providers, any content provider that contributed to the
objectionable content remains subject to civil liability for content
posted online.37
A company that maintains a company Web site is likely a content
provider and not a service provider in situations where antifraud
liability under the ’34 Act is at issue. The SEC requires that third-party
content be attributable to a company for the company to incur liability
under the ’34 Act. Under the entanglement theory, information is
attributed to a company if the company was responsible for the
preparation of the information.38 Content providers meet the
attribution definition under entanglement theory because they are
responsible for the preparation of information or have participated, in
whole or in part, in the “creation or development” of the information.
Therefore, demonstration that a company is entangled with the
hyperlinked information may also demonstrate that a company is a
content provider and outside the bounds of safe harbor protection
under section 230.
C. The Judicial Interpretation of Section 230 Indicates that Companies
Liable Under the ’34 Act are Outside the Scope of Safe Harbor
Courts are generally cautious about extending the scope of safe
harbor under section 230 and will often try to balance the seemingly
narrow congressional intent of section 230 against the apparently
broad grant of immunity in section 230(c)(1).39 Ultimately, the scope
of section 230 is determined by whether the provider is considered a
37

See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com. Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003)
(where soliciting data through an online questionnaire did not constitute “a
significant role in creating, developing or ‘transforming’ the relevant information”
and therefore the online dating service was not an internet content provider under
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).
38
See supra note 13.
39
See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122-23 (refusing to expand section 230 so broadly
as to create an advantage for online businesses over businesses operating in the “real
world”); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008).
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service provider or content provider.40 The clearest example of service
providers with immunity under the section 230 safe harbor are
generally Web sites, like eBay, Google and AOL, that publish content
volunteered by third parties.41 The mantra appears to be that a passive
provider is a safe provider. However, the distinction between a service
provider that merely publishes another’s content and a content
provider that creates and develops content is not clear, especially when
a provider can operate within both spheres.42 To resolve the
distinction, courts have largely relied on the extent of the contribution
to the creation or development of the content and the extent to which
the provider is the “publisher or speaker” of the content.
1. Contribution to the Creation or Development of Content
When a provider is merely a conduit for information and provides
no editorial contribution—similar to a telephone company relaying
signals between two customers—safe harbor under section 230 is
permissible.43 For example, in Zeran v. America Online the Fourth
40

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (establishing
that section 230 immunity depends on whether the provider is an interactive
computer service provider and not an information content provider).
41
See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 714-15 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (provider of online marketplace is an internet service provider); Parker v.
Google, 422 F.Supp.2d 492, 500-01 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating “there is no doubt that
Google qualifies as an ‘interactive computer service’” eligible for immunity under
section 230); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985
(10th Cir. 2000) (provider of e-mail service is an interactive computer service
provider).
42
See, e.g., Mazur v. eBay, No. 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988 (N.D. Cal. July
23, 2008), available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7015046710981
364619&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr (defining eBay as an interactive
computer service provider with immunity under section 230 when eBay failed to
withdraw third-party content it knew to be illegal, but noting that eBay can function
as both an interactive computer service provider as well as an information content
provider).
43
See Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 986 (holding America Online immune from liability
for publishing inaccurate stock information by third parties because the contract
between America Online and the third parties provided that AOL “may not modify,
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Circuit held America Online not liable for inappropriate content
posted to its message board by a third party when America Online
merely provided the message board service and was not involved in
either creating the content or encouraging third parties to post such
content.44
However, a provider who makes a material editorial contribution,
beyond merely transmitting a third party’s content or making minor
edits, will be considered to have participated in the “creation or
development” of content under section 230 and will not be eligible for
safe harbor.45 In Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, a roommatematching Web site was considered a content provider, unable to claim
section 230 immunity, because it was considered the developer of
infringing content when it created a questionnaire and required users
to answer questions that violated the Fair Housing Act.46 Even though
the Roommates.com users ultimately made the selections using a dropdown menu in the questionnaire, Roommates.com was liable as a
content provider because it created a questionnaire where the users
had no choice but to violate the Fair Housing Act.47 The court
determined that “development” is defined as “making usable or
revise, or change” the information it received from the third parties. America Online
was therefore contractually prohibited from being a content provider); Universal
Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 478 F.3 d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007) (determining that a
message board operator is protected under section 230 for postings by third parties,
even when the message board operator knew that the content was illegal, when the
message board operation was not involved in the creation or development of the
content).
44
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
45
See Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, 418 F.Supp.2d 1142,
1149 (D. Ariz. 2005) (denying CDA immunity to a provider that contributes content
and solicits third-party content for a newsletter even though the provider did not
contribute to the creation of the newsletter’s unlawful content); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding a publishing of a gossip column
immune from liability as a service provider, but indicated that section 230 would not
immunize the creator of the gossip column because such a creator is an information
content provider).
46
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
47
Id. at 1172.
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available” or “the process of researching, writing, gathering, organizing
and editing information for publication on web sites.”48 If
Roommates.com had merely created an open-ended questionnaire,
where users had a choice whether or not to provide infringing content,
section 230 safe harbor may have been appropriate because
Roommates.com would not have contributed to the “development” of
the infringing content by either writing, gathering, organizing or
editing the user provided information.49 While a service provider may
offer traditional editorial input without such input being considered a
contribution to the creation or development of content,50 a provider
that induces the unlawful content or impermissibly selects content for
publication will be considered a content provider and outside the
scope of the section 230 safe harbor.51
48

Id. at 1168 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY for
the definition of “develop” and WIKIPEDIA for the definition of “web content
development”).
49
See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com. Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003)
(soliciting data from an open-ended questionnaire where users filled in blank space
did not constitute “a significant role in creating, developing or ‘transforming’ the
relevant information” because the users had a choice whether to provide infringing
content and, therefore, the online dating service was not a content provider. In
contrast to Roommates.com, the court considered the answers unlawful, not the
questionnaire).
50
Mazur v. eBay, No. 07-03967, 2008 WL 618988 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2008)
(deciding whether to publish is a traditional editorial function that is acceptable for
an internet service provider seeking safe harbor under section 230). See also Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (determining that a defendant was not an
information content provider of an e-mail when he made minor alterations to a
tortious e-mail provided by a third party to include in a newsletter); Doe v.
Friendfinder Network, Inc, 540 F.Supp.2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008) (finding that a
provider who re-posted a profile on a social networking site with “slight”
modifications that did not contribute to the injurious character of the posting was
immune from state law causes of action).
51
Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1166-69 (a service provider cannot claim safe
harbor if it “contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct,” such as
when it requests users to supply discriminatory criteria or uses the unlawful criteria
to limit information that users can access). Compare NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No.
06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009) (citing Fair
Housing Council to bar StubHub from claiming section 230 immunity when it
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Under current jurisprudence, a court would likely characterize a
company, liable under the ’34 Act for hyperlinking to third party
content, as a content provider. In particular, posting hyperlinks is an
editorial function and clearly “creation or development.”52 The
judiciary has refused to immunize service providers that have either
contributed more than traditional edits to the content53 or contributed
materially to the development of the third-party content.54 Under the
entanglement theory of attribution, an issuer can only be liable under
the securities laws when the issuer has so involved itself in the
preparation of the information that the content can be attributed to
the issuer.55 Such preparation involves more than mere editing or
providing a conduit by which third parties may pass along information.
Rather, in order for information to be attributed to a company, the
company must have aided in the development or creation of the
content; by implication, this content is deemed to represent the
company’s views.
Like in Fair Housing Council, a company liable under the ’34 Act for
fraudulent hyperlinks is more than a “passive transmitter” when it
contributes, at least in part, to the development of infringing content
by researching, gathering, and making the third-party content available
on its Web site. Because the entanglement theory has substantial
requirements for the content to be attributed to a company, a
company that is found liable under section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and
Rule 10b-5 may also be considered a content provider and, therefore,
ineligible for the section 230 safe harbor.

“materially contributed to the illegal ‘ticket scalping’ of its sellers” by allowing ticket
scalpers to resale tickets in a way that blocked the identify of the resellers and
purchasers), with Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that Craigslist was
immune as a service provider because Craigslist did not “induce[] anyone to post any
particular listing or express a preference for discrimination.”).
52
See supra text accompanying note 45.
53
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
54
Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1167-68.
55
See supra text accompanying note 13.
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2. Provider as Publisher or Speaker of Content
In addition to considering the extent of editorial contribution,
courts have also weighed the extent to which a provider is said to be a
publisher or speaker of third-party content when distinguishing a
content provider from a service provider.56 In Anthony v. Yahoo!, Yahoo
sent profiles of former subscribers of its dating service to current
subscribers in order to mislead and induce current subscribers to
continue subscribing.57 While the profiles were created by third parties,
Yahoo was considered a “publisher or speaker” of the profiles when it
intentionally misrepresented the profiles to current subscribers of the
dating service.58 Because Yahoo was considered the “publisher or
speaker” of the misrepresented profiles, Yahoo was considered a
content provider and was barred from using the section 230 safe
harbor as a defense for its tortious actions.59
A company found liable for violating the ’34 Act would likely be
considered a content provider and outside the scope of the section 230
safe harbor pursuant to the holding in Anthony. Just as Yahoo was
considered a content provider when it used former-subscriber profiles
to perpetrate a fraud or misrepresentation, a company liable under the
’34 Act would be a content provider when the company uses
hyperlinks to misrepresent material information to investors.60 Under
the adoption theory, attribution is presumed when a company

56

Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that if the “information is provided to
those individuals in a capacity unrelated to their function as a provider or user of
interactive computer services, then there is no reason to protect them with special
statutory immunity.”).
57
Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1259-60.
58
Id. at 1263. The court also considered Yahoo an information content provider
when it created false profiles to send to subscribers because Yahoo was entirely
responsible for the creation or development of such content.
59
Id.
60
Of note, in both situations, the profiles used by Yahoo or the third-party
information used by a company are not themselves unlawful, it is the use of the
content by Yahoo or a company that is impermissible.
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intentionally hyperlinks to third-party content unless the circumstances
surrounding the use of the hyperlink, such as the presence of a
disclaimer, would lead a reasonable investor to understand that the
company has not adopted the hyperlinked content.61 Therefore, a
company that implicitly adopts third-party content may also be
considered a content provider under section 230 because the company
is necessarily using third-party content to misrepresent information to
investors and perpetrate a fraud under the ’34 Act.
Regardless of whether content is attributable to a company under
the entanglement theory or the adoption theory, a company liable
under the ’34 Act for hyperlinking to fraudulent third-party content
will likely be considered a content provider because the company is (1)
aiding in the creation or development of the content, as distinguished
from providing minor editorial contributions like in Zeran; (2)
contributing to the development of the infringing content by
researching, gathering, and making available infringing third-party
content on its Web site like in Fair Housing Council; or (3) using the
third-party content to perpetrate a fraud or misrepresentation like in
Anthony.
CONCLUSION
Because the SEC’s Guidelines indicate that company liability
under section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 for hyperlinked
third-party content require the hyperlinked content be attributable to a
company, a company would likely be considered an information
content provider under section 230 and outside the scope of the
section 230 safe harbor for interactive computer service providers. As
such, section 230 safe harbor may not immunize a company from a
section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 violation.

61

See supra text accompanying note 13.
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PRACTICE POINTERS


To avoid the possibility of liability, companies that post statements,
disclosures, and reports on their Web sites should protect
themselves as if they could be held liable under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 for embedded hyperlinks to
fraudulent third-party content.



A company that embeds hyperlinks to third-party content on its
Web site may avoid antifraud liability by using disclaimers, intermediary screens, exit notices between the issuer’s Web site and
the third party’s Web site, or explanations of why the links were
provided to ensure that the content is not attributed to the
company.



Because 47 U.S.C. § 230 can be harmonized with the SEC’s
Guidelines on antifraud liability for information on company Web
sites, section 230 safe harbor is likely a poor defense against private
causes of action for fraudulent misstatements or omissions
involved in the sale or purchase of securities under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.

